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The main opportunity or challenge that confronts us in the face of the robot is the
fact that these artifacts are a curious sort of thing—a kind of anomaly that does not
quite fit in the existing social order. On the one hand, they are designed and
manufactured technological objects. They are things. And like any of the other things
that we encounter and use each and every day, they only have instrumental value. In
other words, they are a means to an end. Yet, and on the other hand, these things are
not quite like other things. They seem to have social presence, they are able to talk
and interact with us, and many are designed to mimic or simulate the capabilities and
behaviors that are commonly associated with human or animal intelligence. Robots
therefore invite and encourage zoomorphism, anthropomorphism, and even
personification.
Consider, for example, what is now a rather common but still surprising social
practice. Users of digital voice assistants, like Siri and Alexa, often find themselves
saying “thank you” to the artifact. This is both curious and disorienting. We typically
do not express gratitude to things. We use our automobile to travel around town
without ever feeling the need to say “thank you” to the vehicle. But if we take a taxi or
use a ride sharing service, we will—or we think we should—say “thank you” to the
operator of the vehicle, whom we recognize as another person. Because digital voice
assistants are things that talk like another person, we often (and rather unconsciously)
respond to the object as if it were something other than a mere thing, e.g., a kind of
someone to whom we feel obliged to say “thank you.”
It is, of course, possible and entirely reasonable to explain and excuse these
behaviors as mistakes. But what these “mistakes” reveal and make visible is that the
line dividing person from thing is neither fixed nor stable. The boundary separating
who is a person from what is a thing has been flexible, dynamic, and alterable. This is
actually a good thing; it is a feature and not a bug. Ethics and law both innovate and
advance by critically questioning their own exclusivity and accommodating many
previously excluded or marginalized others, recognizing as persons what had
previously been considered things.
The question we now face in the face or face plate of the robot is to decide
whether these artifacts are and can be treated as things that we (human beings) can
use and even abuse as we decide and see fit? Or whether they would, due to their
specific social circumstances and interpersonal contexts, require some level of
personification and even the extension of some aspects of moral or legal personality?
These questions, which have been a staple in science fiction since the moment the
robot stepped foot on the stage of history—quite literally in this case, since the word
“robot” is initially the product of a 1920 stage play by Czech playwright Karel Čapek—
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are no longer a matter of fictional speculation. It is science fact and a very real legal
and philosophical dilemma.
Resolving this seems pretty simple. All that would be needed is to assemble
the facts and evidence, develop a convincing case, and then decide whether to
categorize robots as one or the other. This is not just good reasoning, it’s the law. In
fact, the binary distinction separating who is a person from what is a thing has been
the ruling conceptual opposition in both moral philosophy and jurisprudence for close
to 2000 years. When the Roman jurist Gaius (130–180 CE), in a treatise he titled
Institutes, explained that law involved two kinds of entities, either persons or things,
he instituted a fundamental ontological division that has been definitive of Western
(but not just Western) moral and legal systems. In the face of others—another human
being, a nonhuman animal, a tree, an extraterrestrial, a robot, etc.—the first and
perhaps most important question that must be addressed and resolved is “What is it?”
Is it another subject similar to myself, to whom I would be obligated? Or is it just an
object that can be taken-up, possessed, and used without any further consideration or
concern?
Consequently, all that is needed is to decide whether robots are things or
persons. Sounds easy enough. But this is much easier said than done. In fact, robots
(along with artificial intelligence systems and other seemingly intelligent artifacts) do
not quite fit or easily accommodate either category. Being neither an objectivized
instrument that is a means to an end nor another kind of socially significant subject,
these other kinds of socially situated others resist and confound efforts at both
reification and personification. They therefore frustrate and complicate the prevailing
order—the mutually exclusive either/or—that has helped us make sense of ourselves
and others by distinguishing who is to be recognized as a legitimate social subject
from what remains a mere object or thing.
Ultimately, however, this is not just about technological artifacts. It is about
us. It is about the moral and legal ontologies that human beings have fabricated to
make sense of all that is. It therefore is about and concerns the fate of a myriad of
others whom we live alongside and that dwell with us on this exceptional and fragile
planet. What is seen reflected in the face or faceplate of the robot is the fact that the
existing moral and legal categories—a classification system that has persisted for close
to 2000 years—are already broken or at least straining against their own limitations.
And what is needed in response is not some forceful reassertion of more of the same
but a significantly reformulated moral and legal ontology that can scale to the unique
challenges of the 21st century and beyond. Confronting and responding to this will
undoubtedly be as terrifying and exhilarating as any of the robot uprisings that have
been imagined in science fiction, because getting this right will require nothing less
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than a thorough rethinking of everything we thought was right, natural, and beyond
question. Fasten your seatbelts; it’s going to be quite a ride.
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